Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1986

First Nations Self-Government in Canada
Peter A. Cumming
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Diana Ginn

Source Publication:
Nordic Journal of International Law. Volume 55, Issues 1-2 (1986), p. 86-116.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Cumming, Peter A., and Diana Ginn. "First Nations Self-Government in Canada." Nordic Journal of
International Law 55.1-2 (1986): 86-116.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

First Nations Self-Government in Canada
By PeterA. Cumming and Diana Ginn.
I. The concept of self-government
The terms >>self-governmento and >>self-determinationo when used in the context of
native peoples' government, have a broad range of meanings and are often used
without precision. For the purposes of our discussion, two fundamentally different
concepts must be distinguished.
First, native peoples in Canada, as with all Canadian citizens, have the rights of
citizenship and provincial residency, to participate in the federal and provincial institutions of government within Canada, a federal state. In addition, Indian peoples
living on reserves have the right to participate in band council elections and government, as provided in the IndianAct. As federal legislation, the IndianAct's provisions are, of course, entirely dependent upon the wishes of Parliament. Thus, Indian
local government provided by the Indian Act, is analogous, in so far as its basis, to
municipal governments constituted under the authorizing legislation of the various
provincial legislatures. Any such governments have delegated and dependent powers, and can be conveniently referred to under the generic term of >>Indian municipal government<.
Bill C-52, which died on the order paper after first reading June 27, 1984, of the
2nd Session, 32nd Parliament, provided in section 1 that it might be cited as the >>Indian Self-Government Acto and provided in section 3 that an >>Indian Nationo< (defined by section 2 to mean one or more bands, or any other Indian community) might
>seek recognition<(, but all powers conferred upon such Indian Nations would have
derived from the legislation itself, and be subject to the possibilities of amendment
and repeal. Thus, while Bill C-52 would have provided much more latitude for local
decision-making than is seen with the relatively more paternatlistic IndianAct regime, both forms of government are in concept and status >>municipal selfgovernments<.
The second concept or basis of government arises through having sovereign powers. Thus, under the sovereign allocation of powers provided by the Canadian
Constitution.,both Parliament and the ten provinces have certain legislative powers.
Neither level of government can encroach upon the legislative authority of the other,
and subject to constitutional amendment, the authority to legislate within their respective spheres of legislative competence is absolute. This form of government can
be said to constitute osovereigno self-government.
For native peoples, the concept of full self-government is closely related to theories of sovereignty and inherent rights. Nationhood and government have been described as >>manifestations<(l) of sovereignty, which represents the authority exercised
as of right by a state over its people and territory.(2) An inherent power is one which
flows from the existence of a sovereign state and is not delegated or given by any
other government.(3) The inherent jurisdiction of a self-governing nation includes
the right to define its own form of government and its membership; to regulate land
use and ownership, and the domestic affairs of its members; to exclude people from
its territory; and to enforce and administer its laws.(4) For Indians, self-government
is also >inextricably linked to the achievement of self-determination and the preservation of the Indian cultural heritage< .(5)

It has been argued that a community's right to self-determination should be recognized if it was formerly an independent nation, or part of a nation, with its own tribal
organization, and if the community still exists as a group which has not been assimilated into the dominant society.(6)
Before contact with Europeans, the Indians of North America formed sovereign
nations (7), each with a style of government developed to meet the needs of the particular nation. Some of the political systems, for instance, that of the Iroquois, were
quite complex.(8) Many Indians do not regard themselves as having relinquished
their sovereignty; in fact, they view the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (9) and the treaties as recognizing Indian sovereignty.(10) Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867 (11), which gives the federal government jurisdiction over AIndians and lands
reserved for Indians<, is seen as giving the federal government the responsibility of
>honoring and protecting<<(l 2) the agreements made between the Crown and Indian
nations.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is also seen as confirmation of the right
to self-government by those who view Indian self-government as an aboriginal right.
Section 35 1) states that the >existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed<. Obviously, however, the
phrase ))existing aboriginal and treaty rightso could be interpreted in a number of
different ways. There are those who view section 35 1) as practically meaningless,
while others argue that it encompasses a full range of rights. Attempts to clarify this
section have been made at the three constitutional conferences on aboriginal issues
which have been held since the patriation of the Constitution in 1982.
1I. Constitutional Conferences.
Section 37 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provided that, within a year of the Act coming into force, a conference was to be held to discuss:
Matters that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada, including the identification and definition of the rights of thosepeoples to be included in the Constitution
of Canada.
In preparation for the 1983 conference, Prime Minister Trudeau met in June of
1982 with representatives from the Assembly of First Nations, the Native Council of
Canada, and the Inuit Committee on National Issues.(13) (Representatives of the
newly formed Metis National Council were later invited to conference). In the fall of
1982, two working groups were established, one to deal with political and legal issues
(including self-government), and the other to focus on economic, social and cultural
rights.( 14)
The conference, held on March 15 and 16, 1983, lead to the signing of an accord
by the four native organizations, the federal government, nine provinces, and the
two territories. Quebec did not sign.
Although a significant constitutional amendment on equality (15) was agreed
upon, little was accomplished in the area of self-government. To a large extent, the
1983 accord was a recognition of the fact that most of the topics on the agenda had
not been dealt with fully and that further discussion was needed. Thus, the accord
provided that another constitutional conference was to be held within one year, with
an agenda which would include those items not fully considered at the 1983 conference. (16)
In accordance with the 1983 agreement, a second constitutional conference was
held on March 8 and 9, 1984. Some months before the conference, working groups

were again established to deal with a number of topics, including aboriginal selfgovernment.
In his opening remarks at the conference, Prime Minister Trudeau stated:
o There is nothingrevolutionaryor threatening about the prospect of aboriginalselfgovernment. Aboriginalcommunities have rightful aspirationsto have more say in
the management of their affairs, to exercise more responsibilityfor discussions affecting them ...... The Government of Canadaremains committed to the establishment of aboriginalself-government and it is my impression that the provinces are
very much of the same mind. And so, we are not here to consider whether there
should be institutions of self-government, but how these institutions should be
how they should
brought into being; what shouldbe theirjurisdictions,.theirpowers;
fit into the interlockingsystem ofjurisdictionsby which Canada is governed.«(17)
Prime Minister Trudeau later proposed a constitutional amendment, to the effect
that the >aboriginal peoples of Canada have the right to self-governing constitutionset(18), however, the nature, jurisdiction and fiscal arrangements of these institutions would have to be defined through negotiations with federal and provincial
governments. This proposal did not receive much provincial support, and therefore
had to be dropped. (19) The Assembly of First Nations then approached the Prime
Minister with the suggestion that a unilateral amendment be brought in Parliament.
Prime Minister Trudeau indicated that he would be willing to consider this only if the
wording of the federal proposal were left unchanged, and if all four of the native organizations at the conference agreed with the A.F.N.'s suggestion. No such consensus could be reached among the four groups. (20)
At the 1984 conference, it was agreed that another conference would be held the
following year. This third First Ministers Conference on Aboriginal issues took place
on the second and third of April, 1985. Prime Minister Mulroney opened the conference by urging support for a proposed "Accord Relating to the Aboriginal Peoples
of Canada" prepared by the federal government. (21)
The federal proposal began with a general statement:
Whereasthe aboriginalpeoples of Canada,being descendantsof thefirst inhabitants
of Canada,are uniquepeoples in Canadaenjoying the rights thatflowfrom theirstatus as aboriginalpeoples,from treatiesandfrom landclaims agreements, as well as
rightsflowing from Canadiancitizenship, and it is fitting that
(a)
there be protection of rights of aboriginal peoples in the Constitution of
Canada,
(b)
they have the opportunity to have self-government arrangements to meet their
special circumstances as well as the opportunity to exercise their full rights as
citizens of Canada and residents of the provinces and territories, and
(c)
they have the freedom to live in accordance with their own cultural heritage
and to use and maintain their distinct languages; (22).
The accord then provided for an amendment to the Constitution,
to recognize and affirm the rights of the aboriginalpeoples of Canada to selfgovernment within the Canadianfederation, where those rightsareset out in negotiated agreements...(23)
The Constitution would also be amended to include a commitment by the federal
and provincial governments to participate in negotiating
with representativesof aboriginalpeople living inparticularcommunitiesor regions,
agreementsrelatingto self-government that areappropriateto the particularcircumstances of these people.(24)

The federal accord proposed that agreements dealing with self-government could
provide for a variety of arrangements including ethnic-based government, public
government, modifications to existing governmental structures to accomodate the
unique circumstances of the aboriginal peoples of Canada and management of, and
involvement in, the delivery of programs and services. (25)
A number of specific matters relating to self-government which could be addressed in negotiation of an agreement were also set out in the federal proposal. These
included
Membership in the group of aboriginal people concerned;
(a)
(b) the nature and powers of the institutions of self-government;
(c)
responsibilities of, and programs and services to be provided by, the institutions of self-government;
(d) the definition of the geopgraphic areas over which the institutions of selfgovernment will have jurisdiction;
(e)
resources to which the institutions of self-government will have access;
(f)
fiscal arrangements and other bases of economic support for the institutions
of self-government; and
distinct rights for the aboriginal people concerned.(26)
(g)
The federal government also seemed amenable to a constitutional amendment
which could prohibit agreements signed by the federal and provincial governments,
and aboriginal representatives, from derogating from the protection already afforded aboriginal rights by the constitution.
The four aboriginal organizations participating in the First Ministers Conference
appeared ready to accept the federal proposal, as did five provinces, (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba). While agreeing in principle, Quebec was unwilling to support a constitutional amendment.
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia all refused to support
the federal proposal. British Columbia suggested that the constitution be amended
to state that
the aboriginalpeoples of Canadaare entitled to rights of self-government within the
context of the sovereign authorityof the Parliamentof Canada,and the Legislatures
of provinces now provided for in the ConstitutionofCanada, that are set out in
agreements.... (27)
Not surprisingly, in light of British Columbia's evident desire to limit aboriginal
rights its suggestions did not receive much support.
Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia also presented their own amendments, proposing
that the following sections be added to the ConstitutionAct, 1982:
35.01
The rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to self-government, within the context of the Canadian federation, that are set out in agreements in accordance with
section 35.02 are hereby recognized and affirmed.
35.02
The rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to self-government may for the purposes of section 35.01... (are those) set out in agreements concluded with representatives of aboriginal people that are appropriate to the particular circumstances of
those people (which)...
a)
include a declaration to the effect that section 35.01 applies to those rights; and
b)
are approved by an Act of Parliament and Acts of legislatures of any provinces
in which those aboriginal people live.« (28)

Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia were not willing to see a commitment to negotiate agreements with aboriginal representatives included in a constitutional amendment.
Instead, it was suggested that this be set out in a political accord.
Had the five provinces which supported the federal proposal, and the four aboriginal groups agreed to the Saskatchewan-Nova Scotia amendments, these could then
have become part of the constitution. (approval by seven of the ten provinces, with
more than 50% of the population of Canada, is needed for any constitutional
amendment). It is probable, however, that an amendment dealing with aboriginal
rights would be seen by the federal government as also needing the support of the
aboriginal organizations invited to participate at the constitutional conferences.
However, a number of the provinces who had backed the federal government made
their agreement to the Saskatchewan-Nova Scotia proposal conditional on aboriginal support. This support was only partially forthcoming. The Metis National Council and the Native Council of Canada agreed to the amendments, while the Inuit
Committee on National Issues indicated that it would need to consult with the people
it represented before giving a final answer. To allow time for this consultation, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that representatives of the federal and provincial governments, and of the aborignal groups, should meet again within six weeks. The
Assembly of First Nations adamantly rejected the approach taken by Saskatchewan
and Nova Scotia. In particular, the A.F.N. was opposed to the fact that no obligation to negotiate would be included in the Constitution and that, even if an agreement
were reached, it would not take effect until both the federal and provincial government passed legislation to implement it. As the A.F.N. did not change its views with
respect to the proposal, no agreement for constitutional change came out of the subsequent meeting held in 1985.
III The Common Law Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights
The fact that efforts to amend the constitution so as to clarify section 35(1) have not
been successful does not mean that the section as it is now worded is meaningless. Instead, the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights may be used to interpret section
35(1) (29). The recent Supreme Court of Canada case, Guerin et al v The Queen (30)
confirms the existence of such a doctrine.
Before examining the common law meaning of aboriginal rights, it is necessary,
however, to consider the effect of the work )>existingo. While some commentators
have suggested that section 35(1) protects only those rights recognized by a court, or
by the federal government as of April 17, 1982, (the date on which the Constitution
was patriated), most have rejected such a narrow interpretation. It is argued instead
that
the word existing should be read... as meaning ounextinguishedo or osubsistingo
thus excluding rights that had been terminatedby lawful actspriorto the commencement date, but not requiringthat any unextinguished rights have been fully recognized in Canadianlaw before that date. (31)
If this interpretation is correct, then it is necessary to consider whether, at common law, the right of self-government was seen as one aspect of aboriginal rights,
and if so, whether it continued unextinguished until April 17, 1982.
According to the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights, ))discoveryo< of North
America by a European nation gave that nation ultimate sovereignty over the area
discovered and claimed, but this did not automatically destroy all rights enjoyed by
the original inhabitants. Specifically, aboriginal >property rights, customary law

and governmental institutionso (32) were seen as surviving a European nation's acquisition of sovereignty.
There is an established line of cases, running from the 1823 decision of the American Supreme Court, Johnson and Graham'sLeasee v McIntosh, (33) (relevant to
Canadian Law because the Court based its characterization of aboriginal title in British policy in North America), to the 1984 Guerin decision, which recognize certain
aboriginal property rights as having continued to exist after Britain acquired sovereignty over North America. Thus, Britain came to possess the ultimate fee simple to
the land, and while only the Crown had the right to acquire full title to Indian territory, Indian tribes continued to have the right to possess and occupy their lands until
these were surrendered to the Crown. Furthermore, the cases establish that aboriginal title flows from the historic fact of occupation and land use, not from executive
or legislative acts of the government. (34)
Aboriginal laws and customs have also been recognized in a number of cases, and
while these cases have all dealt with family law matters, there is no suggestion that
customary law survived in this area only. (35)
Cases which recognize aboriginal property rights and customary law are relevant
to the issue of self-government in a number of ways. First, several of the cases dealing with aboriginal title show the close tie between property rights and selfgovernment. For instance, the Johnson case states that Indians continued to control
land use in unsurrendered areas. The ability to control a matter such as land use suggests the existence of methods of community decision making. Similiarly, in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Calderv Attorney Generalof British Columbia,
(36) aboriginal title is seen as flowing from the fact that )when settlers came, the Indians were here, organized into societies, and occupying the land as their forefathers
had done for centuries.o (37) A people which form organized societies will have
forms of government.
Obviously, there is also a link between customary law, and self-government. It
might be argued that recognition of customary law is implicit recognition of a community's power to make and enforce laws.
The fact that aboriginal title and customary laws were not created by government
acts, suggests that a right to self-government could also exist without having been
created by the Crown. Similiarly, the fact that aboriginal title can exist along with ultimate title in the Crown, and that )two different systems of civil and even criminal
law may prevail (38) emphasizes that aboriginal self-government could co-exist
with the ultimate sovereignty of the Crown.
Finally, at least two cases give explicit recognition to a continued right of selfgovernment. Thus in Conolly v. Woolrich andJohnson et al, (39) a case dealing with
the validity of a custom marriage, the court held that although British common law
had been transported to the colonies, this did not mean that
the territorialrights, politicalorganization, such as it was, or the laws and useages
of the Indian tribes, were abrogated;(Instead),farfrom being abolished, they were
left in fullforce and were not even modified in the slightest degree, in regardto the
civil rights of the natives. (40)
Even stronger support for the argument that a right to self-government was one
aspect of native life which survived the British acquisition of North America, is
found in Worcester v Georgia,(41) a decision of the American Supreme Court. The
Court held that
a weakerpowerdoes not surrenderits independence, its right to self-government, by
associatingwith a stronger and taking its protection. (42)

In the same decision, it is stated that
our historyfurnishes no example, from the firstsettlement of ourcountry, of any attempt on the part of the Crown, to interfere with the internalaffairs of the Indians,
further than to keep out the agents offoreign powers... The King... never intruded
into the interiorof theiraffairs, nor interfered with their self-government, so far as
respected only themselves. (43)
The court also pointed out that Indian acknowledgement of British sovereignty
involved, practicallyno claim to their lands, no dominion over theirpersons. It merely bound the nationto the British Crown as a dependentally, claiming theprotection of a powerful friend and neighbour, without involving the surrender of their
national character.(44)
In light of the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights, it seems reasonable to argue that a right to self-government is encompassed by the phrase >>aboriginal rights<<
used in section 35(1) of the Constitution. In order to be protected by section 35(1),
however, it must also be shown that the right to self-government was not extinguished before April 17, 1985. There are a number of factors which are most commonly
cited to assert that any right to self-government which may once have existed has
long since been extinguished.
First, it is sometimes suggested that an aboriginal right to self-government is incompatible with ultimate Canadian sovereignty. However, to accept this argument
would be to deny the very essence of the common law approach to aboriginal rights;
that is, that certain aboriginal rights survived the acquisition of sovereignty over
North America by a European Crown.
It might also be argued that section 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct 1867, which allocates jurisdiction over Indians and Lands Reserve the Indians<< to the federal government leaves no room for inherent aboriginal powers of government. Yet, it
should be remembered that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution are primarily directed at defining federal and provincial powers in relation to each other. In this context, section 91(24) could be interpreted as recognizing the existence of a special
relationship between Indians and the Crown, and as protecting this relationship
from provincial interference. The section could even be seen as giving the federal
government the responsibility of honoring and enhancing the rights flowing from a
special relationship with the Crown.
The IndianAct has often been seen as legislation aimed at destroying the aboriginal way of life, including the ability of native communities to manage their own affairs. This interpretation of the IndianAct supports the contention that any inherent
aboriginal right to self-government has been extinguished. However, this view of the
impact of the Act is challenged by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin, to be discussed below.
The next section of this chapter first presents the generally accepted view of the
Indian Act. Then, the approach found in Guerin is used to suggest that perhaps a
right to self-government has survived the Act.
IV The Canadian Situation
Band Council Government
Britain's first Indian policy<< consisted chiefly of maintaining military alliances
with friendly tribes. Not until after the war of 1812 did the British government come
to view Indians as wards, to be >>civilized< and assimilated, (45) a view which was
continued in legislation passed in Canada. In 1876, all statutes dealing with Indians
were combined into the first consolidated Indian Act (46)

It is clearfrom this legislationthat Canacawanted Indians to adoptEuro-Canadian
socialnorms and wished to suppressIndian values and native culture... The goalwas
to annihilateIndians as a separateanddistinct ethnic group. (47)
-Not surprisingly, the wording of such legislation did not appear to recognize Indian
nations as possessing any sovereign rights. Traditional political systems were replaced with an alien form of government, which was described at the time as >>designed
to lead the Indian people by degrees to mingle with the white race in the ordinary avocations of life« and as >)establishing a responsible (form of government) for an irresponsible (people)... to pave the way to the establishment of simple municipal
institutions.o (48) The new form of government was alien not only because it purported to delegate jurisdiction rather than recognize inherent powers, but because it lacked the close connection with the whole life of the community that had characterized
traditional systems. (49) The new form of government was rigorously imposed upon
many Indian groups, such as the Six Nations' peoples near Brantford, Ontario.
Some bands, particularly in the west, did manage to resist the new style of government, and in 1980, approximately 210 bands still used traditional methods of choosing leaders. (50) However, such bands are not recognized by the federal government
as having thus retained any aspect of sovereignty.
The present IndianAct (51), which still reflects the policies of the nineteenth century (52), continues the elected band council form of government first introduced in
1869. Band council powers are still very limited (53). In the 1960's, councils were characterized as >)appendageso (54) which spent most of their time justifying the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs' policies and decisions, rather than making
decisions of their own. (55). Since then, attempts have been made to give band councils more autonomy. For instance, the last Indian agent was removed in 1969; (56)
since 1972, Indian Affairs has provided >>core funding< (57) for council administrative costs; and recently, there has been a trend toward transferring delivery of certain
services (although not the decision-making) from the Department to band councils
(58). Despite these changes, however, band councils still >>serve formally as extensions of the )>DIA« (59). This is hardly surprising since the councils and the federal
government are still operating within the confines of the Indian Act.
The system established in the Indian Act provides for the election of a chief and
councillors by a majority of the adult members of the band (60). (Until 1951, only
men were permitted to vote in council elections). The band council may pass bylaws
on a number of matters, set out in section 81 of the IndianAct. If a bylaw is not disallowed by the Minister within forty days, it then comes into effect (61). Not only can
these bylaws be overturned by the Minister, but they are subject to the IndianAct itself, and any regulations made under it by the Governor in Council or the Minister.
The federal government also controls the government process itself. The Governor in Council may pass regulations dealing with elections (62) and council meetings.
The Minister may declare a chief or councillor unfit to hold office for a number of
reasons including the fact that he has missed three consecutive council meetings without permission (63).
Use of the Municipal Model.
A band council, exercising authority over local matters, and possessing only those
powers delegated by another level of government is, in many ways, similar to a municipal government. A municipal government is created by the province and is generally considered to have those powers which are specifically given, those which are
necessarily implied by the express grant of authority, and those which are essential

to carrying out the basic purposes of the municipal government (64). Since municipal
governments have no inherent powers (65), the general principle is that any exercise
of authority not granted by the province is ultra vires (66). Most municipal governments carry out the dual functions of legislating on local affairs and acting as an arm
of the provincial government for some of its programs.(67) In fact, the trend in the
last several decades has been toward greater integration between the provincial and
municipal governments, with increased provincial funding and involvement.(68)
Furthermore, even in the area of purely local matters there has been a tendency to remove certain matters from the jurisdiction of the municipal government, and place
these with local boards or commissions.(69)
It has been said that
the attempt to impose the municipaltype of local government upon Indianpeoples
has been the most consistently maintainedelement infederal Indianpolicy since confederation. (70)
In fact, bands do not even enjoy all the powers of the larger, more autonomous
municipalities.(71) At best, band councils >are confined to matters with which a rural municipality might normally be concernedo.(72)
Guerin et al v The Queen.
There is no doubt that the IndianAct appears to take a very restrictive view of Indian
powers of government. At first appearance, it is hard to see the legislation as recognizing, or even leaving room for a continued right of self-government.
Since the Guerin decision, however, it is evident that the Indian Act must be read
in light of the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights, and that this approach may
lead to an interpretation quite different from that first suggested by the wording of
the legislation. Thus, in Guerin section 18(1) of the Act, which appears to give the federal government almost complete discretion as to whether a particular use of surrendered reserve land would be >for the use and benefit of the bando, is interpreted
as placing restriction on the Crown, rather than on aboriginal rights. Section 18(1)
is seen as
confirmation... of the historicresponsibilitywhich the Crown has undertaken to act
on behalf of the Indiansso as to protect theirinterests in transactionswith thirdparties (73),
and as
an acknowledgement of an historic reality, namely that Indian Bands have a beneficial interest in their reserve and that the Crown has a responsibilityto protect thatinterest... (74)
The Guerin decision also emphasizes the fact that aboriginal title did not originate
with government acts. Once it is found that legislation such as the Indian Act is not
creating a new right, but is simply recognizing one which already existed at common
law, it is necessary to interpret the legislation in the way most compatible with the
continuation of that right.
If these two aspects of the Guerin case are applied to the IndianAct and the right
of self-government, it seems that the Act may not have extinguished that right. The
right of self-government exists at common law, independent of any legislation. Therefore, band government provisions of the Indian Act must be interpreted in a manner compatible with the continued existence of that right. Thus, perhaps the Indian
Act has merely recognized certain areas of aboriginal jurisdiction, rather than delegated new powers. Any jurisdiction not included in the Act has simply not been recognized, which is very different from extinguishment. Furthermore, those sections of

the Act which appear to permit the federal government to disallow band by-laws,
and to give the Crown a wide discretion over band monies can, since Guerin, be seen
as merely regulatory, rather than as extinguishing the right of self-government.
V Proposals for Change
The 1946 Joint Committee.
In 1946, in response to growing criticism of its Indian policy, the federal government
appointed a special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons to review
the Indian Act and recommend changes. The Committee started from the assumption that the rights and responsibilities of Indians should be exactly the same as those
of other Canadians; anything else would constitute discrimination (75). The paradox
of this ethnocentric view is that the view itself expresses a most severe form of discrimination toward native peoples. Clearly, the Committee accepted the views of a
well-known anthropologist who recommended that the government should
abolishgraduallybut rapidlythe separatepoliticaland socialstatus of Indians...; to
enfranchisethem and merge them into the rest of thepopulationon an equalfooting.
(76)
The Joint Committee presented its report in 1947, recommending that Indians
should move from their present position as wards of the government to full citizenship, and that DINA officials should help Indians to achieve the rights and responsibilities attendant upon this new status. All Indians should be given the federal vote,
and Indian women should be allowed to vote in band council elections. Band councils should become municipal governments and receive increased federal funding.
Federal and provincial governments should work together to co-ordinate the provision of services to Indians.(77)
Although the Joint Committee probably felt that its report was very progressive,
Indians at the time were proposing something entirely different. There were no Indian representatives on the Committee and a suggestion that Indian observers be invited to the Committee meetings was rejected. (78) Some Indian groups did, however,
present briefs, and others sent written submissions. Indian suggestions ranged from
greater independence in local government, to full sovereignty, with the majority supporting self-government for band councils.(79) It was argued that Indian nations
had never relinquished their sovereignty and that self-government would be >a fundamental first step toward acknowledging the treaty relationship between Indians
and the Crowno.(80)
The recommendations for self-government were not reflected in either the Joint
Committee's report, or the Indian Act of 1951.
The Hawthorn Report.
Nearly two decades after the appointment of the Joint Committee, the federal government established a Commission to study the social, educational, and economic
situation of Indians of Canada and to offer recommendations where it appeared that
benefits could be gained< (81).
The Commission's two volume Survey of Contempory Indians in Canada(82) (often referred to as the Hawthorn Report) was published in 1966.
According to the HawthornReport, The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs wished to see
the reservecommunity operatingasa municipality within the appropriatemunicipalprovincialstructure, receiving the same grants, carryingout the samefunctions, accepting the same responsibilities,and subject to the same controls and limitationsas

apply to non-Indian communities at equivalent social and economic levels of development. (83)
The continuation of band governments independent of the provinces and in a direct
relationship with the federal government was )>unacceptable(< (84) to the Department.
The Hawthorn Commission agreed that some form of local government other
than the present system should be extended to Indian communities. It recommended
that for the purposes of grants from both federal and provincial governments, and
shared cost programs, Indian governments should receive the same treatment as
provincial municipalities (85). For other matters, however, it would be >>premature<
(86) to decide whether local Indian governments should be under federal or provincial jurisdiction. The Report warned that an immediate move toward placing such
governments within the provincial sphere would be resisted by Indians (87) and that
patterning Indian government on municipalities would not greatly increase Indian
autonomy over local affairs (88). The Commission recommended that, ultimately,
the choice as to the appropriate framework for local government be left to the Indians themselves (89).
While the Hawthorn Report recognized that many Indian bands should exercise
greater control over their own affairs, it did not feel that increased autonomy would
be reasonable for all Indian communities. The selection of those reserves with sufficient people and resources to make the establishment of local government appropriate should be done by a Local Government Bureau set up within the Department of
Indian and Northern Affairs (90).
While the Hawthorn Report did use the phrase >self-government< it saw this as
meaning only a restructured form of local government since
small numbers, geographic diffusion and the lack of economic and other resources
preclude the possibility of an independant Indian nation-state being created to satisfy ... Indian aspirations (91).
Despite its restricted use of the term >self-government<, the Report did make two
important advances. First, it characterized the federal government's control over
Indian reserves as a form of )>internal colonialismo (92) which deprived Indians of
any significant control over their own futures. Secondly, it rejected the idea that Indians would have to choose between special status and full citizenship. The recommendation that Indians should be viewed as having special rights was used by Indian
leaders to resist the next major federal policy initiative (93).
The 1969 White Paper
In 1969, the federal government introduced a White Paper entitled A Statement of
the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (94). This came after fairly extensive
consultations with Indian delegates who had made it clear that other issues should be
dealt with before the Indian Act was amended.
Specifically, they demanded recognition of treaty obligations and aboriginal rights,
the establishment of a Claims Commission, and a lifting of federal and provincial restrictions on hunting and fishing (95). The White Paper did not reflect the Indian position. Instead it recommended repealing the Indian Act, eliminating any special
status for Indians, closing down the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs
within five years, and turning band councils into municipal governments within provincial jurisdiction.(96) It also dismissed land claims based on aboriginal title, and
downplayed the importance of treaty obligations.(97) The emphasis of the White
Paper was on >)equalityo in the sense that Indians were now to be like everyone el-

se.(98) The objective of social progress for native peoples would be realized if there
was equality in law. Special educational and social programs would be utilized to
achieve equality in fact. Special legal status was seen as impeding progress toward
equality of opportunity for Indians.
Indians quickly rejected the White Paper as a blatent attempt at assimilation.(99)
Probably the best known response is the 1970 statement by the Indian Chiefs of Alberta, Citizen Plus, (100) which argued that the >special history, rights, and circumstances of Indian People< (101) required that a special status be recognized. This
status was not to be in place of, but in addition to the rights enjoyed by other Canadians. Reaction against the White Paper was so strong that, in 1971, its recommendations were withdrawn by the federal government (102).
Optional Band Government Legislation.
A few years later, the federal government drafted an OptionalBand Government
Act which would have transformed those bands which wished to come under the legislation into federal municipalities.(103) Each such band was to draw up a charter
setting out the form of government to be used, its basic capacities, and its accountability to members.(104) Some of the authority given the Minister in the Indian Act
would be delegated to the band level.(105) Later, the government considered changing the word >>charter((, to >>constitution<(, hoping this would be more acceptable to
Indians. However, although a constitution is usually taken to mean the >>fundamental law<< (106) of a sovereign nation, the federal proposal in no way recognized Indian
sovereignty. Instead, whatever the terminology, any power possessed by Indian governments would be a delegation from Parliament rather than an exercise of inherent
rights.(107) The proposed legislation was not welcomed by Indians.(108) For instance, the Union of Nova Scotia Indians described the approach as >)practically and philosophically unacceptable<, differing from the present system only in that )>bands
would be forced to give their consent to ministerial paternalism as the price of symbolic self-determination<.(109) This federal proposal was also later withdrawn.
Indian reaction to the Optional Band Government Act reflected the growing emphasis on self-government. The concept of aboriginal rights, which had first been
used mainly in connection with land claims, was expanded throughout the 1970's to
embrace the idea of an inherent, sovereign right to self-government.(1 10) Undoubtedly, two factors that served as catalysts in this development were first, the process
of land claims in Arctic Canada where the Dene and Inuit emphasized that it was important for governmental institutions to be controled by native peoples to achieve
their objectives, and second, the process of constitutional reform initiated by the
Trudeau government which both provided a forum for native leaders which focused
upon constitutional change and also drew the native peoples into a relationship of
support for the federal Government; proposed changes provided that there was some constitutional recognition and protection of native rights.
VI. The 1983 Report on Indian Self-Government (PennerReport)
Summary of Recommendations
In 1982, a House of Commons Special Committee on Indian Self Government was
appointed to make recommendations to Parliament regarding
possibleprovisionsof new legislationand improvedadministrativearrangementsto
apply to some or all Band governments on reserves, taking into account the various
social, economic, administrative,political and demographic situations of Indian

bands, and the views of Indian bands in regardto administrativeor legal change.
(111)
The Committee was made up of seven members of Parliament, one ex-officio
member from the Assembly of First Nations, and two liason members; one from the
Native Women's Associations of Canada, and the other representing the Native
Council of Canada. The Committee released its Report (often referred to as the Penner Report) (112) in 1983.
The Report consistently uses the term >)Indian First Nations<<, defining a nation as
a >>group of people with a common language, culture and history who identify with
each other as belonging to a common political entity<<.(l 13) The Report recognizes
that, before contact with Europeans, these nations were self-governing.
Since Indians did not have a part in drafting the ConstitutionAct, 1867which gave
the federal government jurisdiction over ))Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians>>,
the first recommendation of the Penner Report is that
The federal government establish a new relationshipwith Indian First Nations and
that an essential element of this relationshipbe Indian self government (114)
The PennerReportmakes it clear that the new relationship should not be based upon
the federal government's Optional Band Government draft legislation or simply
upon further amendments to the IndianAct. (115) That is, a form of simple municipal government was seen as insufficient and inappropriate. The Report also notes
that Indians would reject any attempt to weaken the trust relationship which exists
between the federal government and Indian people (116).
The Committee sees bands, with a )newly defined (117) membership, as the starting point for self-governing First Nations, with each band left to decide whether it
would constitute an Indian government on its own, or whether it would join with
other Indian communities (118). One method of determining membership would be
to start with the existing band now registered under the Indian Act and any of its
members reinstated by legislation. These people could then include others if they so
wished. The initial members would establish criteria for membership, in accordance
with international convenants on human rights, and would set up procedures for appealing membership decisions (119). A >>necessary first step to forming a governmento would be to ensure that all members of the First Nation, >without regard to
the restrictions of the Indian ActM (120) were given a voice in forming that government.
Those Indians who do not become part of an Indian First Nation would still be eligible for federal programs designed for Indians (121) with representatives of such
Indians meeting with Indian First Nation governments and federal and provincial
governments to ensure that the interests of all Indians are protected.(122)
The PennerReport recommends that a clearly stated right to self-government be
entrenched in the constitution (123). Until the provincial consent needed for such an
amendment is attained, the Report proposes that the federal government should explore all other avenues, including the introduction of new legislation. It suggests that
the terms of an >>Indian First Nations Recognition Acto should be negotiated between the federal government and representatives of Indian First Nations. This suggested new legislation should establish the criteria for recognition as a First Nation
government; for instance, that a significant majority of the members have clearly
shown their support for the form of government, and that the membership code and
appeal procedures are in accordance with international standards (124). The proposed Act should also specify the procedure for extending recognition to a government.
The PennerReport recommends that applications for recognition be considered

by a panel appointed jointly by the federal government and Indian First Nations.(125) Because of the special relationship between Indians and the Crown, the
Governor General should affirm federal recognition of First Nation Governments.(126) After recognition, the Indian First Nation government would negotiate
with the federal government as to the jurisdiction it would exercise. The jurisdictional agreement could be renegotiated at a later date if this seemed appropriate.(127)
Legislation would be needed to allow the federal government to enter into and ratify
such agreements.(128)
The Penner Report recommends that the federal government should use its constitutional jurisdiction over >Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians<< to >>occupyo
(129) areas of jurisdiction which but for section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867
would be within the provincial sphere. This would be done through federal enactment of legislation dealing with Indians in these subject areas. The federal government should then vacate to recognized First Nation governments >>all areas of
competence necessary to permit Indian First Nations to govern themselves effectivelyo.(130)
Indian First Nation governments could then exercise
full legislative policy making powers in matters affecting Indian people andfull control over the territory and resources within the boundaries of Indian land. (131)
Specifically, the federal and provincial governments should acknowledge an Indian
First Nations government's jurisdiction over education, family matters, use of land
and resources, revenue raising (including taxation of individuals, transactions, land
and resources within its boundaries), economic development, justice, and law enforcement.(132)
Obviously, jurisdictional disputes would arise among different levels of government. Therefore, the Penner Report recommends that a tribunal be established to
deal with such disputes. The powers and format of the tribunal would be negotiated
between the federal government and First Nation representatives.(133)
The Report predicts that ultimately
claims settlements, Indian control and development of their land base, new arrangements for resource revenue sharing, and other long term entrenched financial arrangements (will) in due course provide Indian First Nation governments with assured
funding. (134)
At present, however, band councils have little choice as to how they spend money received from Indian Affairs, since funds are tied to a particular program or service.
The Penner Report recommends eliminating department control of budgeting and
spending, with Indian First Nation governments accountable instead to their own
members. First Nations should receive federal funding in the form of direct grants,
with one single payment covering the cost of all government operations and services.(135) The amount of funding should be determined by a modified per capita formula« (136) agreed upon by the federal government and First Nation
representatives. The funds should be provided through some mechanism similar to
the transfer payments to the provinces.(137) Thus, the Penner Report sees the present transfer system of unconditional grants, through the equalization program,
from the federal treasury to so-called have-not provinces, as being the model for fiscal arrangements for First Nation governments.
The Penner Report also recommends that funding should be provided to correct
serious inadequacies in the infrastructure of Indian communities, and to cover the
cost of preparing and applying for recognition.
The Penner Report suggests that, if national native organizations agreed, the fede-

ral government should use the 345 million dollar Native Economic Development
Fund to start a bank which could provide loans for economic development within
Indian First Nations.(138) Also, the revenue now held in trust by the government for
Indian bands should be transferred directly to First Nation governments. Capital
funds should be transferred to a >trust management system(( set up for the use and
benefit of the Nation's members.(139)
The Penner Report describes land as >a prerequisite for, and vital to selfgovernmento (140). Therefore, the federal government should give high priority to
providing land to communities now without a reserve, and to settling land claims. A
>>just and effectiveo (141) claims process should be set out in legislation after negotiation between the federal government and First Nations. Where a settlement cannot
be reached, a party should be able to take the claim to a >quasi-judicial( (142) body
for a decision. Indian First Nations would receive adequate funding for the preparation and presentation of claims. Finally, in the Penner Report's perspective, claims
should not be seen as superseded by law (143) and the policy of extinguishment
should be ended.(144)
The Report stresses that recognition of Indian First nation governments as a >distinct order of government within the Canadian federation< (145) involves an obligation on the part of the federal government )>to act in the best interests of First Nations
as those interests are percieved by Indians themselves«.(146) In order to carry out
this obligation, the Report suggests that the federal government set up a Ministry of
State for Indian First Nation Relations. This Ministry would, when so requested by
First Nations, support the interest of Indians against competing interests of other
individuals or governments (147). Secondly, an independent officer should be appointed to review official actions involving First Nation Governments and report its
findings to Parliament.(148) Furthermore, the PennerReport recommends that federal funding be provided to establish an advocacy office to represent First Nations'
interests in legal proceedings.(149)
As Indian First Nations increasingly control their own affairs, the Indian Affairs
Program within the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs would no longer be
needed. The Report suggests phasing it out within five years.(150).
Commentary on the PennerReport
(a) The Approach.

Despite its many recommendations, and the discussion on each, the PennerReport
has been described as a
model, not afully developedplan of how Indian bands and thefederalgovernments
structurescould be reformed to bring about Indian self-government.(151)
and as a obroadlyconceivedblueprintfor reformo (152). In light of the Report's emphasis that changes should be negotiated between Indian representatives and the federal government, it is not surprising that many of the details of the move toward
self-government are left open. While there are questions, some of them quite significant, which are left unanswered, the Penner Report does take an identifiable position.
The PennerReport recommendations do not reflect traditional government policy. Successive Indian Acts, based on nineteenth century ideas of assimilation and
,civilizationo, replaced traditional Indian political systems with a very restricted
form of delegated authority. Protest against this loss of self-government is not new.
Certain bands managed to retain their own methods of choosing leaders, and Indi-

ans presenting briefs to the 1946 Joint Committee argued that Indian nations had never relinquished their sovereignty. The concept of the inherent right to
self-government was implied in the Citizen Plus rejection of the 1969 White Paper
(153), and in 1975, the Dene Nation demanded its own political jurisdiction within
Canada (154) and its own political institutions. By the end of the last decade, the
right to self-government was seen by Indians as a significant component of aboriginal rights (155).
This growing emphasis on self-government has not been reflected in federal Indian policy. As Indian demands have strengthened, Indian Affairs has recognized the
need to allow band councils more authority, but only as a delegation of power from
the federal government, not as a recognition of Indian sovereignty.
The Penner Report clearly accepts the Indian, rather than the federal, point of
view. It acknowledges that, before the arrival of whites, Indians were self-governing
nations and that Indians did not agree to part with their sovereignty. Equally importantly, the Report adopts terminology used by Indian witnesses, referring to >)Indian
First Nations<, and the recognition rather than the delegation of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Report stresses the importance of the federal-Indian ralationship, emphasizing that it must be changed but not discarded.
(b) Issues
One important issue involved in any discussion of self-government is that of membership. At the same time that the Penner Committee was sitting, another House of
Commons Committee was hearing evidence for its report, Indian Women and the
Indian Act (156). Much of the testimony revolved around the question of membership. The Assembly of First Nations and other groups which represent status Indians
insisted (as they have on other occasions) that the authority to determine membership is an inherent right of any self-governing nation, and that the federal government must not attempt any further interference with this right (157). Organizations
representing native women and certain non-status groups have been equally adamant in their demands that the federal government rectify the situation it created
with the Indian Act and reinstate those who have lost status through discriminatory
sections of the Act. Such groups have demanded that a membership code which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex be a precondition for recognition of an Indian First Nation government (158).
One Commentator has suggested that the PennerReport >sideso (159) with the
Assembly of First Nations. However, the Committee's recommendations on membership do not appear to be quite that clear cut. While the Report does not specifically endorse the idea of reinstating those who have lost their rights, it does suggest that
the starting group for forming a First Nation could be those Indians in the community who are registered under the Indian Act, plus those who might be reinstated by
any changes in legislationo (160). This initial group, and any others which it wished
to include, would then develop a membership code which should be in accordance
with the standards in international covenants concerned with human rights< (161).
Such covenants would prohibit differential treatment if based on certain grounds,
including sex.
The Report goes on to state:
The Committee assertsas aprinciplethat it is the rightfuljurisdictionof each Indian
First Nation to determine its membership according to its own particularcriteria.
The Committee recommends that each IndianFirstNationadopt, asa necessaryfirst
step to forminga government, a procedure that will ensurethat allpeople belonging

to that FirstNation have the opportunityof participationin the process offorming
a government, without regardto the restrictions of the Indian Act (162)
Rather than >>sidingo with one group or another, the Penner Committee appears to
have striven for a generally acceptable middle ground. The membership issue has
been superceded by recent events. The first wave of legislative reform in respect of
the IndianAct has now taken place, through Bill C-31 enacted June 12, 1985, whereby the membership provisions have been revised substantially, achieving >>equality<
for female band members in respect of rights.
Also related to the issue of membership is the question of the future of individuals
or whole bands who do not become members of Indian First Nations. The Report
suggests that >>the federal government consider using a general list as a means of
providing special status< (163) for such people. Those on the general list would be eligible for federal Indian programs. However, a number of questions arise. For instance, would eligibility for the general list continue to be determined under the
present Indian Act? Secondly, if First Nations take over the delivery of services to
their members, how many of its present programs will the federal government continue for those on a general list? If the Indian Affairs Program were phased out, there would also be the question of which department would administer these remaining
programs. Presumably, also, some provision would have to be made for the share of
trust funds and reserve lands belonging to individuals or bands who do not become
First Nation members. All these considerations can perhaps be reduced to one question; what relationship will be maintained between the federal government and those
Indians on a general list?
A second major issue which must be addressed in a discussion of self-government
is that of jurisdiction. The PennerReport is careful not to compare an Indian First
Nation government to existing non-Indian governments. Instead, it refers to First
Nation governments as a >distinct order of government within the Canadian federation( (164). Although the Report recommends that funding for Indian First Nation
governments be patterned on federal-provincial fiscal arrangements, the PennerReport would create Indian First Nation governments with jurisdiction broader than
that of provincial governments. The Report suggests that the federal government use
its jurisdiction under section 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct 1867 to occupy areas
which are in the provincial sphere and then vacate these and certain federal fields
to leave room for Indian First Nations to exercise >>full legislative and policy-making
powers in matters affecting Indian people< (165). Thus, an Indian Government
could legislate in areas that would otherwise be provincial, as well as in federal areas.
It has been suggested that the Penner recommendations >threaten to sever the ties
between Indian Nations and the Canadien community<< (166). One basic principle of
a federal system is that two levels of government exist, with a division of powers such
that each has a >direct impact on the individual citizens and other legal persons within its area of competence< (167). Thus, in Canada, both the federal and a provincial
government can legislate for, and impose taxes on the same individuals, and both levels of government are directly accountable to the electorate (168).
The PennerReport, however, would create a system where in its own words,
Legislative authoritywould.. .be with Indiangovernments, and theprimaryrelationship of the Indianpeople involved with the federal government would be through
these governments. (169)
This suggests that if an Indian First Nation decided to occupy all the areas of jurisdiction open to it, the federal government would have little direct contact with members
of that Nation. Certainly, this would not be a federal system as we now know it. Per-

haps there is even the danger that if a federal government could not legislate for, or
tax, people belonging to a First Nation it might decide to remove their right to vote
federally, thus forcing Indians to choose between being members of an Indian First
Nation, or Canadian citizens (170). These speculations are, however, far removed
from the intention of the Penner Report itself, which takes pains to state that Indian
First Nation Governments exist within a federal system, and that
the exercise ofpolitical self-determination is a necessary step toward national unity.
Canada would be strengthened not weakened as a result. (171)
A consideration of the jurisdiction of Indian First Nations also raises the question
of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (172) would apply. The
Charter applies to both the federal and provincial governments, although section
33(1) provides that
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare, in an Act of Parliament or the legislature... that an Act, or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
This declaration would have to be reviewed every 5 years.
There is no indication that the Penner Committee itself saw Indian First Nation
governments as exempt from Charter provisions. Yet, section 25 of the Charter states that
(t)he guarantee of certain rights andfreedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogatefrom any aboriginal, treaty or other rights that pertain to the aboriginal people of Canada...
and it has been suggested that if self-government were characterized as an aboriginal
right, then the Charter could not be used to challenge decisions of Indian First Nations (173). If this were so, however, it would leave First Nation Governments with
a wider latitude than either federal or provincial governments.
A third aspect of the Penner Report is the number of new offices which it advocates establishing; for instance, a Minstry of First Nation Relations, a tribunal for settling jurisdictional disputes, and independent officer to review government dealings
with First Nations and a federally funded advocacy office for First Nations. At the
same time, if the Penner recommendations were followed, the Department of Indian
and Northern Affairs would be phased out within five years. The Report suggests
that the Department should not simply be adapted to take over the new functions because of Indian mistrust of it (174).
Any new agencies or departments should, according to the Penner Report, remain
fairly small, as a large staff would be unwieldy and would have to use a greater percentage of federal funding for First Nations on its own administrative costs (175).
Furthermore, the larger and more bureaucratic a department became, the more difficult it would be for it to respond positively to change. The Penner Report also emphasizes that any new government body would have to avoid the attitude that it
knows what is best for the new governments (176). Federal recognition of the right
to self-government would be a major change and would involve some mistakes on
both sides and some element of trial and error. However, solutions to initial problems should be worked out between the two levels of government, not imposed on
one by the other.
federal Response to the Penner Report
On March 5, 1984, DINA issued a brief >Response to the Report on Indian SelfGovernmentw (177). This begins with an acknowledgement that oIndian communi-

ties were historically self-governing« (178) and an agreement to abandon the proposed Optional Band Government legislation. The federal response requires ))further
clarifications of the possible implications (179) of the constitutional entrenchment
of self-government, and places more stress than did the Penner Report on the need
for consultation with the provinces. In the area of non-constitutional change, the federal government does agree to introduce legislation to
establish aframeworkfor those IndianFirstNations that wish to govern themselves
and their land in a way that is not possible under the Indian Act (180)
Since this would have to fit within the current Constitution, not all the powers referred to in the PennerReport could be included. The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs also states that it would be ready to )ease current administrative
constraints (181) surrounding program planning and delivery. The Department
would not be phased out until recognized Indian First Nation governments had taken over the programs now provided by Indian Affairs.
On June 27, 1984, Bill C-52, entitled >An Act relating to Self-Government for
Indian Nations was introduced in Parliament. It did not go beyond first reading.
The preamble to the Bill re-affirmed the federal government's special responsibility
toward Indians, recognized that Indian communities were )>historically selfgoverning< and stated that the federal government is
committed to continuingandstrenghteningIndiangovernments on lands reservedto
Indians by providingfor the recognitionof the constitutions of Indian Nations and
the powers of their governments.
Section 2 of the Bill defined an Indian Nation as one or more bands, or any Indian
community sharing a common culture, history and language.
Under bill C-52, applications for recognition would have been decided upon by a
seven member panel, appointed by the Governor in Council, on the Ministers' recommendation (182). three of the members would have had to be Indian and the Minister would have been required to consult with Indian representatives before
recommending names for these three positions or that of chairman. Only the Governor in council could have overruled decisions of the panel (183). The right of overrule would have given the federal government the final say on deciding whether to recognize a band as a nation. This represents a divergence in approach from the Penner
Report, which saw such decisions as being made jointly.
In order to be eligible for recognition under Bill C-52, an Indian First Nation
would have been required to draw up a written constitution, consistent with ))democratic principles and the CanadianCharterofRights andFreedom (184). Although,
as mentioned earlier, an argument could perhaps be made that the Charterwould not
apply to First Nations Governments, in this Bill the federal government is clearly taking the position that Indian First Nation governments, like the federal and provincial
governments, would be subject to the Charter.In Bill C-52, a First Nations's constitution would have included a membership code, which would have had to respect
band membership rights acquired under the IndianAct, and to be in accordance with
the Charterand international covenants on human rights. Government accountability, the protection of individual and collective rights, mechanisms for dealing with
serious financial difficulties, a method for reviewing executive decisions, and a procedure for appealing membership decisions, were among the other matters to be dealt with in a constitution (185).
Members of the Indian First Nation applying for recognition would have to have
voted in favour of such a move, in a referendum held in accordance with regulations
made under the Act (186). In order to have been recognized, an Indian First Nation

would also have been required to have negotiated a draft funding agreement with the
federal government (187).
Furthermore, a band applying for recognition would have had to have been one
for which land was held by the federal government (188). This is far more restrictive
than the Penner Report for it would allow only bands now registered under the Indian Act to apply. The Report recommended that the federal government make it a priority to provide a land base for Indian communities presently without a reserve
(189), and clearly saw such communities as having the right to apply for recognition.
Section 13 of Bill C-52 provided that a recognized Indian First Nation Government would have the capacity of a natural person and could enter into contracts, and
acquire, hold and sell property.
Where a band was recognized as a nation, the rights, assets and liabilities of the
band would have been vested in the Nation, and lands held for the benefit of the band
would now be held by the Crown 4for the use and benefit of the Indian Nation, subject to the same terms and conditions (190). Since the underlying title to Indian reserves is owned by the provincial Crown (191), the federal government could not by
itself, turn over this ownership to First Nations.
The objects of an Indian First Nation government as set out in section 15 of the Bill
would have been to act as a government authority within the Indian Nation's boundaries; to protect the individual and collective rights of members, and to promote
their general welfare; to protect the cultural heritage of the Nation; and to use, manage, develop and regulate the First Nation's lands and resources.
Within its boundaries, an Indian First Nation government would have had legislative jurisdiction over education, taxation of real property, charges for public services, voter eligibility in and procedures for referenda to change its constitution,
membership decisions, law enforcement, and other matters decided upon between
the First Nation and the Minister at the time of recognition (192). These further matters could have included zoning and land-use planning; public health and safety; the
environment and resources; the licencing of trades and businesses; public order and
the administration of justice; family law; property rights; and local matters relating
to the good government of the Indian Nation (193). Once an agreement for any of
these further powers had been signed, the parties could then have agreed that the sections of the Indian Act dealing with those matters would no longer apply.
The executive powers of an Indian Nation within its boundaries would have included the management and administration of lands, the establishment of government
institutions and offices, the provision of public works, community facilities, and social services, the economic development of the Nation, the operation of schools, and
the undertaking of any of its legislative powers (194).
Bill C-52 would have allowed an Indian First Nation government to enter into agreements with other governments relating to the exercise of the Indian government's executive powers or regarding programs of the other government which
affected Indian land (195).
Bill C-52 also dealt with the situation where members of a First Nation had aboriginal or treaty rights to land outside the First Nation's boundaries. The First Nation
government could have passed legislation dealing with protection of wildlife and the
environment and the regulation of hunting, trapping and fishing on those lands
(196). This would have been very different from the present situation, where band
councils are not given any authority over land off the reserve.
Section 28 of the Bill prohibited the passing of any legislation which conflicted
with the CharterofRights andFreedoms,or with international covenants on human

rights. The reference to the Charter raises the question of whether First Nation governments could, like the federal and provincial governments, enact legislation expressly notwithstanding certain sections of the Charter. The reference to
international human rights covenants raises a slightly different question. At present,
although the Federal Government can sign international agreements that affect areas
of provincial jurisdiction, only the provinces can pass legislation implementing such
agreements (197). Without section 28, it might have been argued that a First Nation
Government would be bound by international agreements falling within its sphere of
jurisdiction only if these agreements were implemented by the First Nation government. It seems that section 28 would have precluded any such argument with regard
to human rights covenants. Section 3 of Bill C-52 stated:
A law of an Indian Nation that is recognized, or anyprovision thereofmay be disallowed by the Governor-in-Councilat any time.
This right of disallowance is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that First Nations would have jurisdiction and status analogous to that of the provinces. Section
55 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867provides that Royal Assent can be withheld from federal bills. Section 90 states that a number of provisions of the Act, including those
dealing with the disallowance of acts >hall extend and apply to the legislatures of the
several provinceso. Although in the early years of confederation, the federal government was fairly willing to use this power (over one hundred provincial acts were disallowed between 1867 and 1925) (198), in recent times the power has not been used
(199). Thus, section 31 of Bill C-52 would not, in theory have given the federal government greater powers over First Nation legislation than over provincial acts. Instead, the question would have been whether, in practice, the federal government
was willing to exercise the same restraint toward Indian legislation as it has come to
show toward laws passed by the provinces. Bill C-52 would have allowed the Minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, to enter into funding agreements
with Indian First Nations. The PennerReport suggested that funding should be patterned on existing federal-provincial fiscal arrangements; however, section 55 of the
Bill simply spoke of the provision of funds >over such period of time and subject to
such terms and conditions as are specified in the agreementW. This very general language would presumably have allowed different nations to have very different funding arrangements with the federal government. Section 55 also provided that
funding agreements could deal with the transfer to the First Nation of money held
for the use and benefit of its members by the federal government, and section 56
would have required that Indian First Nation Governments submit a yearly report to
the Minister, showing the application of federal funds.
Where the Minister was of the opinion that an Indian First Nation government
had )abused its powers and (was) in serious financial difficulty or (was) unable to
perform its functionso (200), Bill C-52 would have provided for the apppointment
of an administrator to carry out the government's essential functions. The government could not then have exercised any of its powers until authorized to do so again.
This provision, which would clearly have placed Indian First Nation governments in
a subordinate position, appears to be a carry-over from the present situation where
band council spending is closely controlled by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.
Bill C-52 would not have affected the application of the IndianAct to individuals
or bands who did not become part of a First Nation (201). The Act would have continued to apply to a recognized First Nation until its first government was established
and its constitution was in force (202). After that, the IndianAct, with necessary mo-

difications, would still apply except as inconsistent with the Indian Nation's constitution, with Bill C-52, or with the powers of Indian Nations as set out in the Bill
(203). Specifically, the Indian Act would still have applied for determining Indian
status under that Act (204).
Bill C-52 also dealt with the application of general federal and provincial laws.
Section 40 stated
subject to the terms of any agreement made pursuant to section 18, 22, 23 or 25 and
subject to the constitutions of Indian Nations, allfederal laws of general application
inforce in Canada are applicable to and in respect of Indian Nations that are recognized, their members and their lands, except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, regulation or law made thereunder by the Governor
in Council or the governments of the Indian Nations
and section 41 provided that
provincial laws ofgeneral application do not apply to or in respect of Indian Nations
that are recognized, their members or their lands to the extent that the provincial
laws are inconsistent with or in conflict with the terms of any treaty, any agreement
made pursuant to section 18, 22, 23 or 25, the constitutions of the Indian Nations,
this or any other Act of Parliament or any order, regulation or law made under this
Act.
These provisions highlighted the fact that an Indian First Nation Government
would be a different >order of government from those which were now know, and
that members of an Indian Nation could be subject to federal, provincial and First
Nation laws.
Bill C-52 did not become law, and it will be for the Conservative Government of
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to consider whether to introduce legislation in response to the Penner Report.
VII. Local Government under the James Bay Agreement.
Section 9 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement required the federal
government to introduce special legislation dealing with Indian local government
over designated land. On June 8, 1984, the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act(205) was
passed.
This Act provides that >>except for the purposes of determining which of the Cree
beneficiaries and Naskapi beneficiaries are Indian within the meaning of the Indian
Act<, the IndianAct does not apply to the Cree and Naskapi bands or to the designated land (206). The new Act prevails over any inconsistent federal legislation, and
over any provincial legislation which is inconsistent with or conflicts with the CreeNaskapi Act or which provides for a matter already dealt with in the Act (207).
Part II of the Cree-NaskapiAct deals with local government. Certain listed bands
are to incorporate, with the rights, assets and liabilities of the old bands vesting in the
new bands. Sections 17 to 20.1 deal with membership, and section 21 sets out the objects and powers of the newly incorporated bands. These include acting as the local
government authority over designated land; using, administering and regulating
land and natural resources and controlling the rights of disposition; managing and
administering band money and other assets; promoting the general welfare of band
members; carrying out community development programs; and preserving Indian
culture. Finally, the new band is to exercise the powers and carry out the duties set
out in any act of Parliament or federal regulations, or in the James Bay Agreement.
Section 22(1) of the Cree-NaskapiAct states that a band has the capacity of a natural person but subsection (2) prohibits the band from engaging in any commercial ac-

tivity other than administering or managing its lands, natural resources and
buildings, or providing public services.
Section 45(1) provides that a band council may pass bylaws >of a local nature for
the good government( of the band, and for its general welfare. The matters which
a council may deal with include band administration and management; public health
and safety; public order; protection of the environment and natural resources; provision of local services; transportation; the operation of businesses and trades; parks
and recreation; and taxation, for local purposes, other than by income tax, of interests in the designated lands or occupants and tenants of such lands. The band cannot,
however, tax Canada's or Quebec's interests in those lands, or their occupation or
tenancy.
Section 46 and 47 of the Cree-NaskapiActallow for planning and zoning bylaws,
and section 48 deals with hunting and fishing bylaws.
Section 53 requires a band council to send the Minister a copy of a bylaw within
thirty days of its coming into force, but failure to do so does not affect the bylaw's
validity.
Part IV of the Cree-NaskapiAct deals with financial administration. Section 90(1)
requires a band to adopt a budget for each fiscal year and section 90(5) states that
band money cannot be spent unless the expenditure is authorized by a bylaw or resolution, and the band treasurer certifies that the money is available. Sections 91 to 94
deal with the keeping of accounts and a yearly audit. Section 100 provides that where
the Minister is of the opinion that >the financial affairs of a band are in serious disorder«, he may give written notice to the band of his intention to appoint an administrator. After the appointment, band money cannot be spent without consent from
the administrator.
Part VI of the Cree-NaskapiAct deals with land ownership. Section 109(1) states
that Quebec retains >>basic ownership< of the lands over which band local government is exercised. Section 109(2) provides that, subject to this Act, the exclusive use
and benefit of the land and natural resources lies with the band, which can administer, manage and use the lands and resources as if it were the owner.
Section 113 states that Quebec owns all the mineral rights and subsurface rights in
the land. However, the right to exploit minerals or other subsurface materials cannot
be granted without permission from the band in question, and the payment of compensation.
When introducing the Cree-Naskapi Act in Parliament, the Minister of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs stated that self-government had been a
>>central themeo (208) during negotiations, but that the Grand Council of the Crees
>explicitly rejected assumptions that this proposal would be used as a model for selfgovernment legislation( (209). It is unlikely that Indian First Nations would see the
Act as an appropriate model, for although it does give the bands a much greater say
in resource development, and greater powers of local government, the authority
exercised by the new band councils is delegated from the federal government. The
form of band local government is that of a municipal government.
VII. The American Situation
Having examined the aboriginal right to self-government in the Canadian context,
it is interesting to consider the American situation. The common law approach to
aborginal rights in Canada has grown out of early American cases, although since
that time the American and Canadian law in this area has diverged. Despite the different approaches, however, one writer has suggested that, in both countries, the aim

has been to assimilate aboriginal peoples, although different methods have been
used (210).
American Indian Legislation.
In 1790, the American government passed its first Indian Trade and IntercourseAct
(211) which extended federal jurisdiction to non-Indians on Indian land. This, and
other Trade and IntercourseActs (the last was passed in 1834), although ostensibly
designed to protect Indians from white intruders, also significantly decreased Indian
sovereignty (212).
In 1830 the Indian RemovalAct (213) forced tribes to move westward, leaving the
land they had traditionally occupied open for white settlement. However, tribal systems of government survived the move, and continued for some time to exercise
considerable authority within Indian territory. Until 1885, Indian courts retained
full criminal jurisdiction on reservations. The Major Crimes Act (214) of that year
transferred jurisdiction over more serious crimes committed on a reservation to the
federal courts.
1887 saw the introduction of the GeneralAllotment Act (215), designed to end
communal land holding and reduce the amount of Indian territory. Certain portions
of Indian lands were labelled surplus« and sold to settlers, with the proceeds held
in trust for the Indians.
In the 1890's, legislation was passed which restricted the jurisdiction of a number
of tribes by allotting tribal lands, abolishing tribal courts, and stating that the laws
of the Indian governments could not be enforced in federal courts (216).
The next major piece of Indian legislation, the Indian ReorganizationAct (217),
was passed in 1934. The Act gave tribes the choice of whether or not to accept a >restructured form of tribal governmento (218) involving a written constitution and bylaws, and open elections. Over two thirds of the tribes voted to accept the new
system. The Bureau of Indian Affairs interpreted the Act broadly as giving the Bureau the authority to veto or ratify constitutions and bylaws, and even to veto tribal
ordinances. However, the Act did increase slightly tribal government powers (219),
establish economic development programs (220) and end the policy of the Allotment
Act, returning unsold surplus to tribal ownership (221).
The 1948 Assimilative CrimesAct (222) provided that federal courts could apply
state criminal laws to areas under federal control. Although this was not specifically
>4ndian legislationo, the Act was interpreted so as to allow the application of state
laws to reserves in certain circumstances (223).
In 1953, Congress passed PublicLaw 280 (224) permitting states to extend their jurisdiction over certain Indian lands. Not until 1968 was a state required to obtain a
tribe's consent before doing so (225).
1953 also saw the introduction of a new policy under which the Bureau of Indian
Affairs drew up lists of those tribes which it felt were sufficiently developed, in economic terms, so as not to need federal services. Federal recognition of such tribes was
withdrawn, as was their immunity from state taxes (226). This policy, which proved
disastrous, was formally ended in 1968.
Also in 1968, the Indian CivilRights Act (227) was introduced. This legislation restricted the jurisdiction of Indian courts to offences with a maximum penalty of a
300 fine, or six months in jail. The 1968 Act also required tribal governments to proide many of the individual rights found in the American Constitution. Allegations of
failure to do so could be brought in the federal courts (228).
The Indian Self Determinationand Education Act (229) of 1975 was designed to

increase Indian participation in the delivery of federal services (230). The Act stated
that the Secretary of the Interior shall
upon the request of any Indian tribe...enterinto a contractor contracts with any tribal organizationof any such Indian tribes to plan, conduct, and administerprorams
or portions thereof,provided in (any existing Indian legislation)...4 (231)
The Secretary may refuse only if he is of the opinion that such a contract would
not result in the proper provision of the service, or in the adequate protection of tribal resources.
American Case Law
The extent to which American tribes are viewed as having retained sovereignty is determined not only by legislation but by a series of cases which deal with the issue.
In 1831, in Cherokee Nation v Georgia (232) the American Supreme Court held
that Indian nations were >domestic dependent nations<<(233) rather than foreign states. The next year, in Worcester v Georgia(234) the same court characterized Indian
nations as
distinctpolitical communities having territorialboundaries within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries.(235)
Since the Cherokee Nation had retained its inherent sovereignty within its boundaries, the court held that the state could not impose its laws over that territory.
In Ex ParteCrow Dog (236) it was held that when one Indian committed a crime
against another on Indian territory, only Indian courts could punish the wrong-doer.
Public reaction to this case (it was felt that a murderer had been treated too leniently)
led to the 1885 Major CrimesAct, which reduced the criminal jurisdiction of Indian
courts. The validity of this Act was challenged in US v Kanga (237). The application
of federal law to Indian territory was upheld on the gorund that a guardian-ward relationship existed, with Indian governments dependent on Congress for their political power.
The next major case in this area occurred in 1903. In Lone Wolf v Hitchcock (238),
the Supreme Court refused to review a purchase of Indian land by the American goernment, although the consent required by a treaty had not been obtained. The
Court held that Congress possessed a plenary power over Indian affairs, and that its
decision in this matter was a political one, not subject to judicial review.
In 1956 in Iron Crow v Oglala Sioux Tribe (239) the American Court of Appeal
upheld a tribe's right to make and enforce laws. The Court also stated that a tribe
possesses the inherent rights of a sovereign government except to the extent that these
have been restricted by Congress.
In the 1975 case of US v Mazurie (240) the American Supreme Court described tribes as ))unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and ... their territory<<(241).
The same year, it was held that a county could not use Public Law 280 to impose
its zoning bylaw on a reserve as this would be >nconsistent with tribal selfdetermination and autonomy <(242).
Summary
The case law reveals the courts' willingness to uphold federal intervention in Indian
government, justifying such intervention on the grounds that Congress has plenary
power over Indian affairs, that a ward-guardian relationship exists between Indians
and the American government, or that a particular action was political and therefore
not open to review (243). Yet, courts have characterized the jurisdiction still exerci-

sed by tribal governments as flowing from retained sovereignty rather than as delegated by Congress. American tribes have been described as possessing > theoretical
sovereignty and some self-governing powers 244). These powers include determining membership, regulating probate and family matters, deciding whether to lease
or surrender Indian land, allotting land to members, taxing those living on the reserve, controlling tribe assets, establishing tribal courts, and passing >>municipal-typeo
laws (245). The Bureau of Indian Affairs still has significant powers, however. The
Commissioner of the Bureau is responsible for >the management of all Indian affairs, and (for) all matters arising out of Indian relationso (246). This power can be
used to disallow tribe ordinances (247). The Commissioner also controls money appropriated for the >benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians;< (248) and because
of the size of the Bureau, a substantial amount of this money goes to administration
(249). However, although Indian tribes in the United States are not fully selfgoverning, it appears that >as tribes adopt more and more American style governmental institutions ... the Bureau seems willing to permit a substantial degree of tribal government (250).
IX Conclusion
Indian dissatisfaction in Canada with their lack of self-control over their own lives
is not new. Within the past decade, however, Indian demands and aspirations have
developed within the concept of aboriginal rights, one aspect of which is selfgovernment. Although the question of how self-government might be achieved within the Canadian federation is very complex, at least some of the theoretical ground
work has been laid. For instance, it seems that any proposal based on the mere delegation of authority, rather than the recognition of certain inherent jurisdiction,
would be rejected by most Indian leaders. By endorsing the concept of Indian First
Nation governments existing within the Canadian federation, yet acting autonomously in a wide range of matters, the PennerReport has given support to Indian demands for self-government based upon an inherent right of sovereignty.
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